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FOREWORD
HORACIO SPECTOR*

I.

WHAT'S THE POINT OF THE SYMPOSIUM?

In August, 2003, I had the honor of directing the Special Workshop on Law and Economics and Legal Scholarship of the 21st IVR
World Congress in Lund, Sweden. The idea was to encourage a group
of legal theorists to examine the transformations that law and economics has brought about in legal scholarship. I had the privilege of
coordinating the deliberations of great scholars (and friends) during a
whole week in the magnificent Scandinavian summer. The theme I
had chosen was anything but new. Indeed, it is now more than twenty
years since a notable group of economic lawyers discussed in a wellknown Hofstra Law Review symposium a set of methodological and
normative issues related to law and economics.1 But much water had
flowed under the bridge and there still was not an overall treatment
of the theme among recent law journal symposia. This symposium
seeks to fill in this gap by offering to law students and professors a
selection of the papers submitted to the Lund workshop.
The contributions address a set of interconnected topics. In a
sense, Lewis Kornhauser's paper addresses the most fundamental
issue.2 He seeks to investigate how law and economics bears on the
jurisprudential agenda of understanding law and legal propositions.
Surprisingly, the concept of law that emerges from this economicsinformed philosophical inquiry is associated with Hart's descriptive
sociological investigation, which concludes that law is a union of primary rules of obligation and secondary rules of recognition, change,

* I would like to thank Professor Aleksander Peczenik, President of the IVR, for his
invitation to organize the workshop in Lund, and Professor Richard Wright for his encouragement to publish this symposium. My thanks are also due to Matthew Bredesen and his colleagues in the journal's staff for their painstaking editorial work.
1. See generally the articles cited in Symposium on CorporateGovernance, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1 (1980).
2. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Governance Structures, Legal Systems, and the Concept of Law,
79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 355 (2004).
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and adjudication. 3 Kornhauser claims that law is a kind of governance
structure built on incentives.
Anthony Ogus 4 and Thomas Ulen5 focus on the influence of law
and economics on legal scholarship, with quite different results. While
Ogus adopts the modest view that law and economics is a useful predictive and explanatory tool for legal scholars, Ulen takes the more
ambitious route of rethinking legal scholarship. Ulen says that, because of its new economic orientation, legal scholarship has already
acquired the two requisite features of a mature science: theorization
and empirical testing. He also discusses the academic implications of
legal scholarship's mutation.
Francesco Parisi and Jonathan Klick 6 consider the new "functional" approach to law and economics, which Kornhauser more classically calls "political economy." This approach looks for the
incentive-based causes of legal rules, rather than their behavioral consequences. The normative version of functional law and economics
favors preference revelation as a decision criterion over the more
traditional utility maximization and wealth maximization. This new
conception of law and economics fits very well with Ulen's view of
legal science as a theoretical and empirical discipline. Indeed, Parisi
and Klick illustrate the new approach with empirical research on the
conditions leading participants to opt for cooperative outcomes.
The central importance of public choice in functional law and
economics seems to support the redesign of law schools' curricula to
encompass public choice. There might nonetheless be strong reasons
to maintain traditional curricula. Guido Pincione 7 discards a diversity
of objections to public choice teaching in law schools, thus taking
sides with Ulen's academic recipe. One of Pincione's telling points is
that public choice teaching may be compatible with and even conducive to a moral and public-spirited stance toward law and politics.
The Public Choice School is, essentially, the result of the economic dissection of questions and puzzles originated in the reflection
3. See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
4. Anthony Ogus, What Legal Scholars Can Learn from Law and Economics, 79 CHI.KENT L. REV. 383 (2004).
5. Thomas S. Ulen, The Unexpected Guest: Law and Economics, Law and Other Cognate
Disciplines, and the Future of Legal Scholarship,79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403 (2004).
6. Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, Functional Law and Economics: The Search for
Value-Neutral Principlesof Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431 (2004).
7. Guido Pincione, Should Law Professors Teach Public Choice Theory?, 79 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 451 (2004).
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on fundamental legal institutions. Might the effect of law on economics be more profound? This is the question that animates Bruce
Chapman's line of research. 8 He seeks to improve the theoretical
structure of economics by borrowing themes and insights from law
and jurisprudence. In his contribution, Chapman tries to solve the
paradox of rational commitment by appealing to the idea of normative requirements, developed by the moral philosopher John Broome.
On Chapman's account of individual practical rationality, normative
requirements interact with reasons to yield rational decisions. Chapman goes on to suggest that this model of practical rationality is also
instantiated in common law decision making, in which the rational
decision may not be the decision backed by the best balance of reasons in a particular case.
In the last two contributions Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci 9 and 110 explore the role of welfare and fairness in understanding and justifying
legal rules. In different ways, we both disagree with Louis Kaplow
and Steven Shavell in denying that welfare maximization is a selfsufficient principle. Dari Mattiacci agrees with Kaplow and Shavell in
treating welfare and fairness as two mutually excluding principles. He
argues that welfare maximization is a consistent but incomplete system of social choice, which means that some decisions must be
reached by criteria other than welfare maximization, typically fairness. Finally, I rebut the implicit assumption that fairness and welfare
play the same role in every legal system, regardless of its historical
configuration. Specifically, I claim that law's commitment to fairness
is stronger in civil law systems.

II. LAW AND ECONOMICS AND LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: THE PATH
TO RECONCILIATION

In the remainder of this Foreword I would like to address the relationship between law and economics and law and philosophy, as
well as the effects of these interdisciplinary approaches on future legal scholarship. In law schools links between legal theorists and economic lawyers vary today from alliance for the intellectual cause to
8. Bruce Chapman, Legal Analysis of Economics: Solving the Problem of Rational Commitment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 471 (2004).
9. Giuseppe Dant Mattiacci, Godel, Kaplow, Shavell: Consistency and Completeness in
Social Decision-Making, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 497 (2004).
10. Horacio Spector, Fairness and Welfare from a Comparative Law Perspective, 79 CHI.KENT L. REV. 521 (2004).
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distrust and open confrontation. For instance, in a friendly mood,
Professor Ulen says in his contribution, "as law schools make a transition to a scholarship that is more congenial to that practiced in the
other Ph.D.-granting units in the great research university, law and
philosophy will find the transition to be easy and will help law schools
make the transition."" In fact, legal philosophy has for a long time
been committed to a scholarly conception of legal education. Still the
pending question is whether, with the growth of the theoreticalempirical kind of scientific enterprise Ulen advocates, there will be
sufficient room for legal philosophy in research-oriented law schools.
The question has an obvious answer if we regard legal philosophy as a theoretical enterprise. Whatever the status of legal scholarship-be it descriptive-empirical or normative-it can always raise
theoretical problems that professional philosophers are well equipped
to discuss and marshal. Even in the most extreme case of a successful
and complete reduction of legal scholarship into economic theory,
there would still be theoretical puzzles flowing from the most abstract
postulates and inferences of economics. So I take it for granted that
legal philosophy, as a branch of philosophy, will always have a prominent theoretical place whatever legal scholarship's future will be.
However, I am more interested in legal philosophy as coming into
conflict with law and economics in the normative realm. Economic
lawyers do not content themselves with finding out the consequences
of legal rules or detecting the causal conditions of their creation and
change. Rather, they usually have normative pursuits. Normative law
and economics typically defends welfare maximization, or wealth
maximization, as a standard to endorse new rules or to appraise existing rules. In so doing it obviously competes with normative legal philosophy. This is the apparent rivalry I would like to discuss.
Normative legal philosophy is, by definition, a form of public ethics, because it concerns the moral justifiability of actions taken in the
public domain, or of social and political institutions. Classical utilitarianism and Rawls's theory of justice are two contemporary positions in public ethics, but we could easily multiply the examples.
Public actions and social and political institutions affect the claims,
interests, welfare, etc. of great numbers of persons. Among those institutions, law typically yields consequences impinging on the whole
citizenry, and sometimes on mere inhabitants or citizens of foreign

11. Ulen,supra note 5, at425.
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states. Decisions like the passing of a law in Congress or the Supreme
Court's overruling of a law have an evident public ethical dimension,
because their upshots - whether intended or unintended -extend to
the society at large. Against the background of these remarks, it is
very easy to show that normative legal philosophy overlaps with
moral and political philosophy. In fact, great legal philosophers like
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Kant, and Bentham were at the same
time moral philosophers. But let me emphasize that normative legal
philosophy and moral and political philosophy bear a necessary connection, not just a contingent, historical one. It is a truth in normative
language that the justification of a decision affecting other people is
ethical in nature. Therefore, the justification of law, which constitutes
the principal object of normative legal philosophy, pertains to the
realm of ethics.
Just as normative legal philosophy, normative law and economics
engages also in the justification of legal measures, whether legislative,
administrative, or judicial. In a trivial sense, normative law and economics is a particular theory among the gamut of normative theories
of law. While positive law and economics can claim a commitment to
the scientific method that legal philosophy does not have or pretend
to have, normative law and economics must openly compete, on an
equal footing, with other normative theories of law. Thus conceived,
normative law and economics is just a technical derivation of utilitarianism. True, law and economics sometimes appeals to maximands
other than happiness, like Pareto efficiency or wealth. This only reveals a value difference, that is, a divergence in the underlying theory
of the good, but not a substantive disagreement as regards the structure of the moral theory defended. Both utilitarianism and normative
law and economics embrace an aggregative teleological ethical theory, which competes with a diversity of nonconsequentialist positions,
from the School of Natural Rights and perfectionist conservatism to
liberal egalitarianism.
If normative law and economics is only one possible position in
normative legal philosophy, then any suggestion that one should cede
terrain in favor of the other seems out of place. However, economic
lawyers might want normative law and philosophy to be the final position in normative legal theorizing, the "end of public ethics," so to
speak. 2 Interestingly, this tenet could not be grounded on any num12. I have borrowed Daniel Bell's metaphor; see DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY:
ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES (rev. ed. 1988).
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ber of theoretical or empirical advances made in positive law and
economics. Whatever its degree of explanatory or predictive success,
positive law and economics cannot yield normative consequences.
This is just a way of rephrasing Hume's famous motto that "is" does
not imply "ought."' 3 A similar idea was defended in twentieth-century
metaethics by claiming that-without assuming the proper naturalist
definition-it is fallacious to draw moral judgments from a set of
premises only containing factual statements.14 Normative law and
economics, like any other consequentialist moral theory, is not "naturally" true. It is absurd to attack nonconsequentialism as implausible
or irrational just by noting that its results are at odds with consequentialism. In the absence of further argumentation, it is questionbegging to dismiss nonconsequentialism by taking a stand on consequentialism. 15 By the same token, it is question-begging to attack fairness-based theories of law by relying 16on the welfare maximization
thesis of normative law and economics.
Curiously, one often finds question-begging arguments in the
criticism of nonconsequentialist moral positions. This might be due to
the fact that an aggregative, maximizing conception of rightness, coupled with a monist theory of the good, has an attractive logical property: it systematically provides a single moral solution for every moral
problem. The association of utility maximization to systematicity and
coherence has led some theorists to assume that utilitarianism is the
only scientific or rational method for reaching moral decisions. Thus,
according to Mill, Bentham, and Sidgwick, it was this concern with
unity and coherence that gave utilitarianism its impetus.17 Similarly, in
his contribution to this symposium Dari Mattiacci contends that coherence is the main motivation of normative law and economics.
Now, as long as one assumes that utilitarianism or some other form of
consequentialism-i.e., normative law and economics-is the only
rational procedure of moral decision making, the criticism of noncon13.

DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed.

1978).
14. GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 38 (1922); see also ARTHUR N. PRIOR,
LOGIC AND THE BASIS OF ETHICS ch.9 (1949); W. K. Frankena, The Naturalistic Fallacy, 44
MIND 464 (1935).
15. I have defended this view in my book, AUTONOMY AND RIGHTS: THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM 175-76 (1992).

16. See generally Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Some Sound and Fury from Kaplow and Shavell, 23 LAW & PHIL. 73 (2004).
17. See Samuel Freeman, Utilitarianism,Deontology, and the Priority of Right, 23 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 313, 324-25 (1994).
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sequentialism can proceed in a noncircular way. As is obvious, the
crucial step is requiring unity and coherence as an adequacy condition
of moral theories, yet this step typically remains undefended.
Normative law and economics is just one position in normative
legal philosophy, and a vulnerable one. To show its vulnerability, I
will summarize four objections that have been raised, more or less
clearly, in recent literature.
A.

The Argument from Autonomy

John Rawls has famously criticized utilitarianism because it ignores problems of distribution between individuals. Provided utility
or other relevant value is maximized, utilitarians do not care to whom
it accrues. Moreover, argues Rawls, utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons because it extends to social
choice the principles of individual choice by mandating the maximization of utility regardless of its location in different persons. 8 This objection has clear Kantian overtones. The claim is that, on account of
its aggregative calculation method, utilitarianism offends the value of
individual autonomy. As I have shown elsewhere, autonomy is a
unique value because it excludes an aggregative practical response; by
its very nature, autonomy must be respected, not maximized. 19
Thereby we should expect an autonomy-based theory of contract law
to yield different substantive outcomes from one grounded on welfare
maximization.
Normative law and economics could escape the above criticism
by two different routes. First, it could restrict itself to a Paretian conception of welfare, dismissing aggregative views, like Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency. While this defense strategy works well in preserving the
value of autonomy, because each person's welfare (or wealth) is neither compared with nor traded off against other people's welfare (or
wealth), it curbs the usefulness of law and economics as legal decision
making is often confronted with options that bring about both gains
and losses for different persons. Second, instead of applying the
maximizing decision procedure on a case-by-case basis-as actutilitarianism requires-one could choose an ex ante, institutional
stance for the purpose of measuring utility or welfare. If the benchmark chosen is sufficiently detached from the positions of particular
18. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (1971).
19. See SPECTOR, supra note 15, at 162.
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persons, one could resort again to a Paretian criterion of choice, thus
avoiding a violation of individual autonomy. For instance, this is the
stance adopted by constitutional economics.
B.

The Argument from Equality

Thomas Nagel, Will Kymlicka, and Charles Taylor have claimed
that utilitarianism offers a distinctive conception of impartiality or
moral equality. 20 On this view, the main point of utilitarianism is not
to maximize utility but rather to realize a conception of persons as
equals. Utilitarianism treats everyone impartially because each person's viewpoint matters equally. Specifically, it respects equality by
employing a procedure of social calculus in which each person's interests count once. As Nagel says, under utilitarian social choice "persons are equal in the sense that each of them is given a 'vote'
weighted in proportion to the magnitude of his interests. '' 21 Since
normative law and economics is a form of utilitarianism, it can be
read in the same fashion. Thus-the argument goes on-there is not
really a conflict between welfare and fairness-based theories of law,
for welfare theories too spell out an egalitarian conception of fairness.
Trading on this egalitarian interpretation of (normative) law and economics, Ronald Dworkin has reached substantive conclusions in tort
law that come surprisingly close to those defended by Richard Posner.2 2 Egalitarians have also maintained that other normative theories
competing with utilitarianism, like Rawls's theory of justice and
equality of resources, articulate more truly or faithfully the ideal of
moral equality.
C.

The Argument from Pluralism

Isaiah Berlin and Joseph Raz have rejected the monist theories
of value adopted by utilitarians and other contemporary political
theorists.2 3 These authors defend perfectionism and value-pluralism,
as well as the possibility of incommensurability among ultimate individual and social options. Since there is no overarching principle of
20. See generally WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE ch.3 (1989);
THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS ch.8 (1979); CHARLES TAYLOR, 2 PHILOSOPHY AND
THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS ch.9 (1985).
21. NAGEL, supra note 20, at 112.
22. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE ch.8 (1986).
23. See generally ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
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choice, value pluralism is not associated to systematic unity and coherence. On the other side of the Atlantic, Anthony Kronman,
probably motivated by Berlin's and Raz's moral theories, has argued
that normative law and economics and its associated decision making
method distort the way decisions are taken in legal settings. Typically,
the judge or legislator is confronted with conflicting, and often incommensurable, values sanctioning different measures. Because of
their incommensurability those values cannot be reduced to utility or
welfare. According to Kronman, it is practical wisdom, and not an
or legislator to find a reaartificial calculus, that can help the judge
4
predicament.1
sonable solution in that
D.

The Argument from Initial Titles

Both critics and defenders of law and economics acknowledge
that the economic analysis of legal norms typically proceeds on the
basis of an existing distribution of titles over physical resources.2 5 This
is crystal clear in the case of a wealth-maximization conception of law
and economics. Willingness to pay, for instance, is a function of the
existing distribution of resources. 26 If this standard is applied to establish the most valued uses, the normative properties of the initial allocation of titles will transmit down to our policy decisions. For
instance, abrogating a barrier to the sale of slaves would be inefficient
(besides unfair) vis-A-vis alternative institutional arrangements despite its being an efficient move as compared with the situation ante.
When the standard to be applied is welfare maximization, do we do
away with the problem? Not quite. First, cost-benefit analysis depends on stable background prices, which, in turn, are a function of
the existing distribution of resources.,7 Second, economic analysis can
dictate, for example, that private ownership is a more efficient prop-

24. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993).

25. See C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3 (1975); Robert Cooter, Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on Causation, 63 CHI.-KENT LAW REV. 523 (1987). For the assumption of self-ownership, see Horacio
Spector, Self-Ownership and Efficiency, in JUSTICE, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: A TRIBUTE TO
ALEKSANDER PECZENIK ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 60TH BIRTHDAY, 16 NOVEMBER 1997, at

359 (1997).
26. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (1972).
27. See Cooter, supra note 25, at 548.
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erty regime than an open commons under conditions of scarcity. 28 Yet
it cannot tell us what particular distribution of ownership is to be preferred according to a welfare standard, nor whether the existing distribution of property rights is the optimal one. Moreover,
restructuring an existing allocation of titles reduces security and,
therefore, may be deleterious for overall satisfaction. 29 Once a property regime is in place, changing it brings about large indirect costs, so
the welfare assessment of legal decisions will frequently be biased by
the existing distribution of titles.
I hope these arguments reasonably show that normative law and
economics cannot be taken as the final position without further ado.
Being an ethical outlook on society and policy, it belongs in the complex and unfinished human debate about the best form to ordain our
living together.

28. See David Schmidtz, The Institution of Property, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: WHAT
REALLY MATTERS, WHAT REALLY WORKS 361 (David Schmidtz & Elizabeth Willott eds.,
2002).
29. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 119-21 (Richard Hildreth
trans., Oceana Publications 1975) (1840).

